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We examine whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric using a sample 
of 745 firms from understudied African countries over the period from 2000–2015. 
We hypothesise and find significant asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
conditional on cash flow and financial constraints. Firms with positive cash flow 
save while those with negative cash flow dissave. These differences are more appar- 
ent in the presence of financial constraints. Our results affirm the asymmetry in 
the cash flow sensitivity of cash and highlight the severity of the impact of financial 




Keywords: Asymmetry, financial constraints, the cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
JEL classification: G01; G31; G32 
 
1 Introduction 
The relationship between cash and cash flow, the cash flow sensitivity of cash, is a con- 
tentious issue in the literature. Almeida et al. (2004), Grullon et al. (2018), Khurana et al. 
(2006) and McLean and Zhao (2018) find a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, which 
they link to the need to hedge against future shortfalls. On the other hand, Riddick and 
Whited (2009) report a negative cash flow sensitivity of cash. They attribute the positive 
relationship in prior studies to mismeasurement error in Tobin’s q that if corrected via 
general method of moments (GMM) estimators results in negative relation. Using an 
augmented framework of Riddick and Whited (2009), Bao et al. (2012) affirm the nega- 
tive cash flow sensitivity of cash. However, Chang et al. (2014) have subsequently shown 
that estimates of cash flow sensitivities based on higher-order moments of the modified 
generalised method of moments (GMM) (see Erickson and Whited, 2000, 2002, 2012) 
are in some cases economically implausible. Similarly, Almeida et al. (2010) show that 
estimators using high-order moments are inefficient and return unstable coefficients that 
are not economically meaningful in the real world. Therefore, these mixed findings and 
conclusions highlight the need for further research. 
It is interesting to note that all the above studies, except for the cross-country studies 
of Khurana et al. (2006) and McLean and Zhao (2018), focus on developed economies, 
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which limits the generalisability of the findings to emerging economies with markedly 
different institutions. Yet, the few extant studies in emerging economies find significant 
heterogeneity in firm financing arising from differences in the level of access to capital mar- 
kets. For example, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) find that institutional infrastructure and 
non-traditional factors significantly influence corporate debt in underdeveloped African 
markets. Similarly, Amaeshi et al. (2016) document that institutional voids (the absence 
of intermediaries) in Africa limit access to external finance, and where the finance is 
available, it is costly and accompanied by restrictive covenants.1 Guariglia and Yang 
(2018) also report that 90% of total financing for individually owned Chinese firms is 
from self-financing sources such as cash reserves, loans from relatives and retained earn- 
ings. To the extent that African firms rely mostly on internal financing sources, they 
provide an ideal independent sample to reconcile and generalise empirical findings on the 
cash flow sensitivity of cash as savings from internally generated cash flow are likely to 
be high and heterogeneous within this context. To the extent that capital markets in 
Africa are different from developed economies where studies are concentrated, they offer 
unique institutional settings to validate extant propositions or theories.2 Understanding 
whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash for African firms is positive or negative and if it 
is asymmetric or not represents, therefore, an interesting research question.3 
In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
by providing further empirical evidence from emerging markets which are understudied in 
the literature. We conjure that limited access to finance in emerging economies is likely 
to make changes in cash (savings) more sensitive to operating cash flow and that this 
sensitivity is asymmetric conditional on cash flow (positive versus negative cash flow) and 
financial constraints. Using a sample of 745 firms (7,280 firm-year observations) drawn 
from eight African countries over the period from 2000 to 2015, we examine whether 
the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric and how financial constraints impact 
on the cash flow sensitivity of cash. Our findings which are robust to the choice of 
estimation technique show that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive and asymmetric 
conditional on cash flow. Specifically, for a one standard deviation increase in cash 
flow, the average firm increases cash holdings by 3.28%. When comparing the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash conditional on cash flow, we find that firms with positive cash flow 
increase their cash holdings by 3.71% for a one standard deviation increase in cash flow, 
which is 52% higher than firms with negative cash flow (2.44%). We further find that 
the asymmetry between firms with positive and negative cash flow varies significantly 
with financial constraints. Consistent with our hypothesis, only constrained firms with 
positive cash flow to save relatively more than unconstrained firms, while constrained 
firms with negative cash flows save much more than their unconstrained counterparts. 
These differences show that financial constraints increase the asymmetry in the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash in the context of emerging economies where firms have limited access 
1Bae and Goyal (2009) find that lenders shorten maturities, reduce loan amounts and increase spread 
when lending in environments characterised by poor legal enforcement. 
2Notwithstanding the contributions of the cross-country studies of Khurana et al. (2006) and McLean 
and Zhao (2018), they do not provide a complete picture of firms operating in African markets as their 
sample only includes South Africa. 
3The extant studies in emerging markets do not examine corporate savings behaviour which is some- 
what surprising given the surge in cash holdings documented in developed countries (see Foley et al., 
2007; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Brown and Petersen, 2011; Bates et al., 2009). 
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to external sources of finance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, 
Section 3 presents the data used in the analyses, Section 4 discusses the empirical results, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Methodology 
To examine the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash, we estimate the following 
model: 
 
∆Cashijt =γ0 + γ1CFijt + γ2DNegijt + γ3CFijt × DNegijt + βX ijt−1 + ijt (1) 
where ∆Cashijt is the change in cash holdings for firm i in country j at time t, γ0 is a 
constant, and γ1 − γ3 and β are parameters to be estimated, CFijt is the firm’s cash flow, 
DNegijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that report negative 
cash flow and otherwise, zero, X ijt−1 is vectors of firm-specific characteristics explained 
below, νj and νt are the country and time fixed effects, and ijt is the error term. The 
vector, X ijt−1, consists of Tobin’s q (Q), the logarithm of total assets (Size), change 
in total debt (∆TDA) and change in property, plant and equipment (∆PPE). 
The extant literature informs the control variables used. For example, Almeida et al. 
(2004), Khurana et al. (2006) and Bao et al. (2012) find that Tobin’s q has a positive 
effect on changes in cash holdings as high-growth firms save to finance future growth 
opportunities. For firm-size, Khurana et al. (2006) find it has a positive effect on changes 
in cash. This arises as firm-size is an indicator of access to external finance and the 
cost of capital (Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Riddick and Whited, 2009). Larger firms 
are more able to save as they have better access to external finance (Almeida et al., 
2004; Almeida and Campello, 2007) and economies of scale in managing cash holdings 
(Khurana et al., 2006; Bao et al., 2012). Several studies find that collateral (PPE) is 
associated with better access to external finance (Campello and Giambona, 2013; Flor 
and Hirth, 2013; Lei et al., 2018). This should reduce the need to hoard cash and lead to 
a negative relationship between ∆Cash and ∆PPE. However, the effect of ∆Debt is not 
apparent as some studies find that debt is a substitute for cash Opler et al. (1999); Gamba 
and Triantis (2008); Kling et al. (2014), while others find a complementary relationship 
(Acharya et al., 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Flannery and Lockhart, 2009). Based 
on the aforementioned studies, we expect firm-size and Tobin’s q to have a positive effect 
on ∆Cash, while ∆PPE should have a negative effect. As literature is not clear on what 
effect ∆Debt has on ∆Cash, we, therefore, do make a prediction for this variable. 
We next estimate a modified version of our initial model to capture the effect of 
financial constraints on cash flow sensitivity as follows:- 
 
∆Cashijt =α0 + α2CFijt + α3DNegijt + α4CFijt × DNegijt + α5DFCijt 
+ α6DNegijt × DFCijt + α7CFijt × DNegijt × DFCijt + βX ijt−1 + ijt (2) 
where DFCijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if we categorise a firm  
as constrained and otherwise zero, and α1 α7 are parameters to be estimated. We 
categorise a firm in each year as constrained (unconstrained) if it is below (above) the 
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median distribution of the logarithm of market capitalisation (MktCap), firm-age and 
tangibility. For our categorisation based on the WW Index (Whited, 2006), we consider 
a firm to be constrained (unconstrained) if it is above (below) the median distribution 
of the WW Index in each year. We use the median to categorise firms into regimes 
rather than the upper (lower) quartiles or deciles as this reduces the likelihood of finding 
significant cross-sectional differences between constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. 
To facilitate comparison with prior studies and for robustness, we estimate Equations 
(1) using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), instrumental variables 
(IV) and general method of moments (GMM3-GMM5). We estimate our main model, 
Equation (2), using the general method of moments (GMM5) based on higher-order 
moments that account for potential mis-measurement errors in Tobin’s q (see, Erickson 
and Whited, 2000, 2002; Bao et al., 2012). 
 
3 Data 
We collect data from Datastream over period 2000–2015 and exclude firms in the finan- 
cial and utility sectors, and those with missing data. To reduce the effects of outliers, we 
winsorise all variables at the upper and bottom 1% percentiles of the distribution. Our 
final sample consists of 7,280 firm-year observations for 745 firms from Egypt, Ghana, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. We describe in detail 
each of the variables in Appendix A. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics and correlations for all variables. The mean 
(median) change in cash (∆Cash), cash flow (CF ), Tobin’s q (Q), size (Size), change in 
debt (∆Debt), change in property, plant and equipment (∆PPE), and R&D are 1.3% 
(0.6%), 15.3% (14.3%), 1.60 (1.35), 15.08 (15.20), 2.1% (0.1%), 3.6% (1.9%), 0.1% (0), 
respectively. The pairwise correlations in Panel B show that change in cash (∆Cash) is 
positively correlated with cash flow (CF ), Tobin’s q (Q) and change in debt (∆Debt), 
while it is negatively correlated with size (Size), change in property, plant and equipment 
(∆PPE), and research and development (R&D). 
 
4 Empirical Results 
We first examine whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric conditional 
on cash flow, and if this asymmetry is affected by financial constraints. Table 2 presents 
the results estimating Equation (1) that relates the change in cash to firm characteristics. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 shows that the cash flow sensitivity of cash ranges between 0.265 and 0.458. 
Our estimate of the cash flow sensitivity of cash in Columns (4) - (6) using general method 
of moments (GMM3-GMM5) based on higher-order moments to correct for potential 




on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and instrumental variables 
(IV), respectively. Columns (4) - (6) show the average firm increases cash holdings by 
26.5% - 44.9%. This result is consistent with the need to preserve financing flexibility, the 
precautionary motive of holding cash, in order to hedge any future shortfalls, especially 
in less developed capital markets where access to finance is limited. The coefficients 
of CF DNeg DFC, in Columns (7) - (12), are consistently negative and significant, 
indicating that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetry conditional on cash flow. 
Specifically, firms with negative cash flow shocks tend to dissave 12.3% - 32.6% while those 
with positive shocks save 29.9% - 45.8% in anticipation of future cash shortfalls.4 These 
findings affirm the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash but differ from Bao et al. 
(2012) in that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive (negative) for firms with positive 
(negative) cash flow rather than negative (positive). We attribute these differences to the 
overreaching need to enhance or increase financial flexibility by hoarding cash and then 
drawing down cash reserves cover negative cash flow shocks in environments characterised 
by limited access to external finance. 
Consistent with prior literature, we find that ∆Debt and ∆PPE have a positive and 
negative effect on ∆Cash, respectively. The negative effect of ∆PPE is in line with 
Flannery and Lockhart (2009) and Kling et al. (2014) who find that firms with better 
access to external finance hold less cash reserves. For the positive effect of ∆Debt, we 
link this result to a host of studies that find a complementary relationship between 
debt and cash holdings (see Acharya et al., 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Flannery 
and Lockhart, 2009). However, the negative effect of Tobin’s q and size on ∆Cash is 
inconsistent with the literature (Almeida et al., 2004; Khurana et al., 2006; Bao et al., 
2012). This finding is somewhat surprising and suggests that changes in cash holdings 
within the African context are not due to the need to finance future growth opportunities. 
Instead, financial constraints appear to be the main reasons for the rise in corporate 
savings, as evidenced by the negative coefficient of firm-size (which is a proxy for credit 
constraints). Given our focus and for brevity, we do not further discuss the results of 
control variables. 
We next examine the impact of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitivity con- 
ditional on the WW Index (Whited, 2006), market capitalisation (MktCap), firm-age and 
tangibility. Financial constraints are more likely to be binding for firms in developing 
markets as access to external finance is limited. This prediction should lead to a high 
asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash for African firms. Table 3 presents the 
results estimating Equation (2) that relates the change in cash to firm characteristics and 
financial constraint indicators. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
For all proxies of financial constraints, the coefficient of the interaction term of cash 
flow and the dummy of financial constraint, CF DFC, is positive and significant, in- 
dicating that constrained firms save 6.4% - 19.3% more than unconstrained firms. The 
results suggest that constrained firms have a higher need to hoard cash in a bid to en- 
hance financial flexibility and hedge against future shortfalls. However, constrained firms 
4Appendix B shows similar asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash for firms in South Africa 
and for those in other countries (excluding South Africa). 
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with adverse cash flow shocks dissave 5.2% - 57.9% more than their unconstrained coun- 
terparts. A comparison of the pre-crisis (2000–2007) and post-crisis (2008–2015) period 
shows that the asymmetry increases in the post-crisis period, which is marked by signifi- 
cant contractions in credit supply. This finding suggests that firms draw-down cash when 
credit supply contracts, and those that can still generate positive cash flow further hoard 
it to strategically increase financial flexibility. 
Overall, our results show significant asymmetry between firms with negative and 
positive cash flow that is more pronounced with financial constraints. 
 
5 Conclusion 
We examine the asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a sample of un- 
derstudied African firms. Our study affirms that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is 
asymmetric as it is positive and negative for firms with positive and negative cash flow, 
respectively. This asymmetry is more pronounced for firms that are subject to financial 
constraints, as constrained firms with negative cash flow dissave while those with positive 
cash flow save a higher proportion of their operating cash flow. Our findings are in line 
with the literature from the developed countries, but the magnitudes and asymmetry of 
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Table 1 Basic statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A presents the basic statistics, and Panel B presents the pairwise  Spearman  (Pearson)  correlations  in  the  upper  
(lower) diagonal for all variables used.  The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast,  Egypt,   
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco,  Nigeria,  South Africa and Tunisia  drawn from Datastream  over  the period from 2000 to 2015.  
All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate  the 
significance of the difference between positive cash flow firms (CF>0) and negative cash flow firms (CF  0) at the one,  five, 
and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Basic statistics 






















CF 0.153 0.143 0.124 0.174 0.154 0.107  -0.074*** -0.053*** 0.061***  
Q 1.600 1.345 0.860 1.628 1.376 0.868  1.275*** 1.088*** 0.683***  
Size 15.080 15.202 2.019 15.099 15.224 1.996  14.856*** 14.951** 2.249***  
∆Debt 0.021 0.001 0.084 0.022 0.001 0.082  0.015** 0.004 0.102***  
∆PPE 0.036 0.019 0.084 0.040 0.022 0.082  -0.012*** -0.007*** 0.091***  
R&D 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003  0.001 0.000*** 0.003***  
N 7,280   6,689    591    
Panel B: Correlations 
Variables ∆Cash CF Q Size ∆Debt ∆PPE R&D 
∆Cash 1 0.340*** 0.035*** -0.028** 0.028** -0.021* -0.017 
CF 0.359*** 1 0.418*** -0.005 0.108*** 0.310*** -0.001 
Q 0.013 0.388*** 1 0.182*** 0.072*** 0.231*** 0.060*** 
Size -0.028** 0.004 0.127*** 1 0.116*** 0.144*** 0.237*** 
∆Debt 0.058*** 0.153*** 0.060*** 0.098*** 1 0.401*** 0.032*** 
∆PPE -0.019 0.285*** 0.138*** 0.076*** 0.413*** 1 0.020* 
R&D -0.036*** 0.021* 0.025** 0.097*** 0.056*** -0.002 1 
 
 
Table 2 Asymmetry in the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s q.  τ  is the coefficient of determination of Equation (2) in Erickson         and 
Whited (2000) and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement quality for the Tobin’s q. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast,  Egypt, 
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia drawn from Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at 
the lower and upper one percentiles. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Estimation  OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5  OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CF  0.265*** 0.309*** 0.315*** 0.449*** 0.331*** 0.351***  0.299*** 0.356*** 0.353*** 0.458*** 0.351*** 0.388***  
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.052) (0.026) (0.020)  
DNeg         -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***  
         (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  













Q  -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.009 -0.090*** -0.041*** -0.049***  -0.014*** -0.012*** 0.006 -0.067*** -0.032*** -0.044***  
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006)  
Size  -0.001** -0.024*** -0.032*** 0.004** 0.001 0.001*  -0.001* -0.024*** -0.032*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001*  
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
∆Debt  0.059*** 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.080*** 0.069*** 0.071***  0.047*** 0.032** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052***  
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)  
∆PPE  -0.131*** -0.179*** -0.206*** -0.082*** -0.112*** -0.107***  -0.130*** -0.172*** -0.190*** -0.094*** -0.117*** -0.109***  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)  
N  7,280 7,280 5,045 7,280 7,280 7,280  7,280 7,280 5,045 7,280 7,280 7,280  
R2 
τ 
 0.173 0.208 0.213 
0.276 0.406 0.366 
 0.186 0.224 0.228 
0.359 0.540 0.443 
 









Table 3 The effect of financial constraints on the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
 
The table presents estimation results of Equation (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s  q.  τ  is the coefficient of determination of Equation (2) in Erickson and Whited     
(2000) and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement quality for the Tobin’s  q.  The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast,  Egypt,      
Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia  drawn from Datastream  over  the period from 2000 to 2015.  All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are   
winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
 
Period 2000-2015 2000-2007 2008-2015 
    
Constraint WW MktCap Firm-Age Tangibility   WW MktCap Firm-Age Tangibility   WW MktCap Firm-Age Tangibility 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CF 0.308*** 0.306*** 0.303*** 0.347*** 0.374*** 0.388*** 0.324*** 0.399*** 0.260*** 0.251*** 0.294*** 0.307*** 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.041) (0.033) (0.037) 
DNeg -0.011* -0.008 -0.017** 0.002 0.009 0.005 -0.002 0.009 -0.021*** -0.015** -0.033*** -0.004 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) 
CF   DNeg -0.470*** -0.456*** -0.483*** -0.501*** -0.517*** -0.633*** -0.593*** -0.623*** -0.426*** -0.379*** -0.505*** -0.461*** 
(0.065) (0.068) (0.062) (0.066) (0.134) (0.114) (0.110) (0.125) (0.088) (0.089) (0.082) (0.090) 
DFC -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.007 -0.016** -0.014** -0.027*** -0.001 -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.011** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
CF   DFC 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.121*** 0.087** 0.064* 0.151*** 0.097*** 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.140*** 0.127*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) 
DNeg   DFC -0.018* -0.027*** -0.002 -0.035*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.042** -0.032* -0.008 -0.018 0.014 -0.034*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
CF   DNeg   DFC -0.332*** -0.376*** -0.282*** -0.303** -0.206 -0.052 -0.123 0.224 -0.496*** -0.579*** -0.395*** -0.505*** 
(0.100) (0.105) (0.100) (0.130) (0.155) (0.144) (0.150) (0.195) (0.143) (0.142) (0.146) (0.164) 
Q -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.065*** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.038*** -0.032*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.004*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Debt 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.033** 0.017 0.025 0.020 0.009 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
∆PPE -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.108*** -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.064*** -0.130*** -0.133*** -0.124*** -0.102*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
N 7,280 7,280 7,280 7,280 2,945 2,945 2,945 2,945 4,335 4,335 4,335 4,335 
τ 0.526 0.529 0.497 0.495 0.492 0.489 0.508 0.478 0.601 0.633 0.499 0.545 





− × × − × 
Assets Assets 
Appendix A Variable definitions 




∆Cash Change in cash holdings to total assets. 
cash flow Earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus the change in non-cash working capital to total assets. 
DNeg A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has negative cash flow and otherwise zero. 
Q Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s q). 
Size Log of total assets. 
∆Debt Change in total debt to total assets. 
∆PPE Change in property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
DFC A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is constrained and otherwise zero. 
WW Index −0.091 × Cash Flow − 0.062 × Dividend Dummy + 0.021 × Total Debt 
0.044 Size + 0.102 Industry Sales Growth 0.035 Sales Growth 
The WW Index (WW) is based on (Whited, 2006). 
MktCap Log of market capitalisation. 
LogAge The logarithm of the difference between the current year and the first year that the firm 
appears in the database. 














































Appendix B Alternative estimates of the cash flow sensitivity of cash 
 
The table presents the estimation results of Equations (1) and (2) that relate investment to cash flow and Tobin’s q. τ is the coefficient of determination of Equation (2) in Erickson 
and Whited (2000) and is an index that varies between zero and one of measurement quality for the Tobin’s q. Panel A and B present the results for the firms in South Africa and 
other countries (excluding South Africa), respectively. The sample consists of 745 listed non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Tunisia drawn from Datastream over the period from 2000 to 2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 

















R2 0.158 0.181 0.195 0.172 0.196 0.209 
τ 0.232 0.332 0.321 0.296 0.431 0.393 
ρ 0.329 0.259 0.184 0.187 0.336 0.261 0.195 0.204 
Pane B: Other countries 
 
Estimation OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CF 0.345*** 0.439*** 0.455*** 0.323*** 0.390*** 0.395*** 0.352*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.175 0.317*** 0.376*** 
(0.022) (0.037) (0.027) (0.097) (0.068) (0.037) (0.024) (0.039) (0.031) (0.174) (0.102) (0.042) 
Dneg -0.033** -0.032** -0.011 -0.045** -0.036** -0.032** 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) 
CF   DNeg -0.476*** -0.709*** -0.316 -0.276 -0.442** -0.512*** 
(0.145) (0.179) (0.207) (0.259) (0.183) (0.152) 
Q -0.018*** -0.010** 0.030 -0.012 -0.030 -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.011*** 0.032 0.023 -0.010 -0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.050) (0.025) (0.019) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.050) (0.037) (0.023) (0.007) 
Size -0.003*** -0.051*** -0.063** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.051*** -0.065** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Debt 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.008 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.001 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) 
∆PPE -0.174*** -0.254*** -0.276*** -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.262*** -0.278*** -0.175*** -0.181*** -0.184*** 
(0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) 
N 1,374 1,374 828 1,374 1,374 1,374 1,374 1,374 828 1,374 1,374 1,374 
R2 0.277 0.372 0.345 0.285 0.387 0.343 
τ 1.453 0.677 0.658 -0.423 1.665 0.822 
ρ 0.780 0.246 0.301 0.305 0.779 0.151 0.249 0.290 
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Estimation  OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5  OLS FE IV GMM3 GMM4 GMM5  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CF  0.249*** 0.282*** 0.294*** 0.528*** 0.328*** 0.337***  0.292*** 0.331*** 0.335*** 0.558*** 0.370*** 0.394***  
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.070) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.077) (0.026) (0.024)  
Dneg         -0.016*** -0.015** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016***  
         (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)  













Q  -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.005 -0.140*** -0.048*** -0.052***  -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.002 -0.107*** -0.041*** -0.049***  
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.035) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.028) (0.008) (0.007)  
Size  -0.001* -0.023*** -0.030*** 0.010*** 0.002** 0.003***  -0.000 -0.022*** -0.031*** 0.008*** 0.002** 0.003***  
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)  
∆Debt  0.050*** 0.037** 0.065*** 0.100*** 0.070*** 0.071***  0.036** 0.020 0.046*** 0.051** 0.046*** 0.046***  
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)  
∆PPE  -0.124*** -0.164*** -0.193*** -0.023 -0.092*** -0.089***  -0.120*** -0.154*** -0.174*** -0.042 -0.095*** -0.088***  
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015)  
N  5,906 5,906 4,217 5,906 5,906 5,906  5,906 5,906 4,217 5,906 5,906 5,906  
 
